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The dawning of the twenty-first century is a convenient time to mine 
the historical record of the past hundred years for insights into the well-
springs of innovation. For historians of the United States who are in-
trigued by the innovations that have been spawned by business organi-
zations, two different narratives jostle for attention. The first highlights 
the organizational capabilities of large corporations like Merck and 
IBM. This narrative was elaborated by Alfred D. Chandler Jr., the most 
influential business historian of the twentieth century, and is a major .~ 
theme of his final two monographs, Shaping the Industrial Century 
and Inventing the Electronic Century. For Chandler, the most epochal 
innovations in business strategy were byproducts oftl1e "paths of learn-
ing" that the large corporation generated; lacking these capabilities, 
fundamental innovation was impossible.1 
The second narrative doubts the centrality of the large corporation 
to business innovation and has ventuTed an alternative explanatory 
scheme that casts the spotlight on either a favorable political economy or 
the dynamism of proprietary firms, industrial districts, and trade as-
sociations. Other narratives have occasionally found favor, including, 
For suggestions and advice, the author is grateful to Edward J. Balleisen, Nancy R. John, 
Matthias Kipping, Pamela Walker Laird, and Mark R. Wilson. 
1 Alfred D. Chandler Jr., Shaping the Industrial Century: The Remarkable Story of the 
Evolution of the Modern Chemical and Pharmaceutical Industries (Cambridge, Mass., 
2005); Chandler, Inventing the Electronic Century: The Epic Story of the Consumer Elec-
tronics and Co1nputer IndustTies (New York, 2001). 
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for example, those that emphasize the ingenuity of individual inventors. 2 
Still others point to social arrangements that encouraged upward social 
mobility and cultural norms that assigned a high value to material bet-
terment.3 Yet, with surprisingly few exceptions, historians interested in 
the ~.elationship between business innovation and business strategy can 
be divided into two groups: those who emphasize the primacy of the or-
ganizational capabilities of the large corporation, and those who do not. 
Prior to 1970, most business_ historians followed Chandler and hailed 
the corporate research and development laboratory as the primary 
engine of innovation. The plausibility of this claim was reinforced by 
the widely publicized achievements of government-funded, corporate-
sponsored "big science? during and immediately following the Second 
World War. These innovations emboldened a small but influential cadre 
of corpor~te leaders to ch~mpion the pursuit of fundamental research-
or what they sometimes called "pure" science-even if this research had 
few obvious commercial apPlications. The supposed efficacy of this re-
search received wide publicity in the triumphalist narratives crafted by 
the public relations departments of giant corporations like AT&T and 
GE; it was taken for granted even by scholarship that was highly critical 
of big business, such as David F. Noble's America by Design.4 
Beginning around 1970, and accelerating in the 1990s, this narra-
tive came under attack. An influential cohort of historians of technol-
ogy led by Merritt Roe Smith and David A. Hounshell emphasized the 
indispensability for business innovation of a favorable political econ-
omy, while a dissellting group of business historians that included 
Philip Scranton and Jonathan Zeitlin documented the innovativeness 
of proprietary firms, industrial districts, and trade associations. s For 
2 Narratives organized around individual inventors have long proved congenial to histori-
ans of technology. For a recent exemplary essay that demonstrates the possibilities of this ap-
proach, see Eric Hintz, "Portable Power: Inventor Samuel Ruben and the Birth of Duracell " 
Technology and Culture 50 (Jan. 2009): 24-57. }'or an exemplary monograph, see W. Be;-, 
nard Carlson, Innovation as a Social Process: Elihu Thomson and the Rise of General Elec-
tric, 1870-1900 (Cambridge, U.K., 1991). 
• 
3 Stanley Buder, Capitalizing on Change: A Social History of American Business (Chapel 
Hill, N.C., 2009); Joyce Appleby, The Relentless Revolution: A History of Capitalism {New 
York, 2010). 
4David F. Noble, America By Design: Science, Technology and the Rise of Corporate 
Capitalism (New York, 1977). ' 
. :Merritt Roe ~mith, Harpers Ferry and the New Technology (Ithaca, 1977); Smith, ed., 
M1lita71! Enterprise and Tech~ological Change: Perspectives on the American Experience 
(~ambndge, rviass., 1985); David A. Hounshell, From the American System to Mass Produc-
~on, 1800-1932: The Development of Manufacturing Technology in the United States (Bal-
timore, 1985); Hounshell and John K, Sµlith Jr., Science and Corporate Strategy: Du Pont 
R&D, 1902_-1980 (New York, 1980); Philip Scranton, Endless Novelty: Specialty Production 
and American Industrialization, 1865-1925 (Princeton, 1997); Jonathan Zeitlin and Charles 
Sabel, eds., World of Possibilities: Flexibility and Mass Production in Western Industrial-
ization (Cambridge, U.K., 1997). -
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the historians of technology, the political economy, by which they meant 
the relationship of the state to the market, spawned incentives that fa-
vored certain business strategies and discouraged others. For the dis-
senters, in contrast) the political economy was far less important than 
the social networks through which economic activity flowed. 
A major goal of The Challenge of Remaining Innovative is to ad-
vance this post-1970 revisionist "research agenda" (p. 3). Its subject is 
business innovation in the tvventieth-century United States; its theme is 
the rise and fall of the large corporation as the primary engine of inno-
vation. Each of the chapters takes as its "starting point" the Chandle-
rian claim that the large corporation was "the most important source of 
innovation" in the early tvventieth century. Yet each subjects this claim 
to critical scrutiny, and, in so doing, demonstrates the "complexities 
and contingent nature" of the "leading role" that the large corporation 
played in spawning innovation (p. 3). The editors of Challenge-Sally 
H. Clarke, Naomi R. Lamoreaux, and Steven W. Usselman-are all dis-
tinguished business historians who have themselves published influen-
tial monographs on related topics, giving this collection of original es-
says the ldnd of authority that is likely to garner it widespread attention 
in the field. Ambitious, intelligent, and often provocative, it should long 
remain a valuable resource for historians, economists, sociologists) and 
management scholars intrigued by the relationship between business, 
technology) and innovation in the United States during a critical epoch 
in its history. 
Had the .. contributors focused merely on complexity and contin-
gency the volume might well have been little more than a grab bag of 
essays on a common subject. Yet they aspire to do a good deal more. In 
particular) they aspire to demonstrate the potential of the information-
centric theory of the modern business enterprise that Lamoreaux has 
been championing for over a decade in a series of influential books and 
articles.6 "Collectively," the editors explain, "the chapters in this vol-
ume suggest that in order to meet the challenge of remaining innova-
tive, large firms had to learn to manage their organizational boundaries 
effectively": 
They had to learn to tap into external sources of knowledge and cre-
ativity without undermining their sense of corporate purpose. They 
6Naomi R. Lamoreaux, Daniel M. G. Raff, and Peter Temin, "Business History and Eco-
nomic Theory," in Oxford Handbook of Business History, ed. Geoffrey Jones and Jonathan 
Zeitlin (New York, 2008), 37-66; Lamoreaux, ~Partnerships, Corporations, and the Theory 
of the Firm," American Economic Review 88(May1998): 66-71; Lamoreaux, Daniel M. G. 
Raff, and Peter Temin, eds., Learning By Doing in Firms, Markets, and Countries (Chicago, 
1999); Lamoreaux and Raff, eds., Coordination and Information: Historical Perspectives on 
the Organization of Enterprise (Chicago, 1995). 
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had to learn to preserve the advantages that their core capabilities 
brought them while at the same time accommodating themselves to 
the shifting complexities of their markets and to changes in the 
larger economic and political environment in which they operated. 
And they had to be able to do all this while making sure that the var-
ious internal unitS of their enterprise worked as a coordinated 
-whole. (p. 3) 
The editors of Challenge seek not only to survey the past, but also 
to provide "insights" for the future. In so doing, they have crafted a 
volume that, at times, reads a bit like a manual for aspiring business 
consultants. Much to the frustration of pundits, forecasters, and the 
authors of how-to books on business management, history is not pre-
dictive. Yet the past is not random, and certain patterns recur. The 
charting of these patterns is the theme that holds the essays in Chal-
lenge together and gives them an analytical coherence that is unusual 
in ventures of this kind. 
The contributors' conception of innovatiori is eclectic. It includes 
the invention of pathbreaking technical contrivances, such as the tran-
sistor and fiber optics; the adoption of novel organizational tools, such 
as traffic management and risk assessment; the institµtionalization of 
new kinds of linkages between business and the university; and the en-
forcement of legislation to discourage monopoly. Like most business 
historians working today, the contributors are attentive to contingency 
and chance, and to failure as well as success. The locus of innovation is 
equally varied. Three essays explore innovation inside the firm; three, 
innovation between firms; and two, the relationship between the firm 
and the state, with a focus on antitrust and federal regulation. Among 
the recurring themes are the waning of the independent inventor; the 
critical role of information as a managerial tool; and the enduring sig-
nificance of organizational capabilities. Though the essays range widely 
in time and space, none focus on government-business relations before 
the Second World War, and none is concerned primarily with innova-
tions that originated after the economic downturn of 1973. Only in pass-
ing do we learn about the post-1970 achievements in information tech-
nology and biotech, and, with a few notable exceptions, we learn little 
more about the influence of the state on the innovative process. 
Talcen together, the essays in this collection tell a familiar story. In 
the period between the late nineteenth century and the present, the pri-
mary engine of innovation in American business shifted first from the 
independent inventor to the industrial research laboratory and, most 
recently, to the entrepreneurial networks that thrive in industrial dis-
tricts like Silicon Valley. This theme will be well known to business his-
torians and historians of technology; in fact, over a decade ago, David A. 
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Hounshell told a broadly similar story in a pair of influential essays on 
the rise and fall of industrial research. 7 
VVhile the general outline of this narrative is familiar, several of the 
essays break new ground. The persistence into the twentieth century of 
independent inventors in the Midwest is for Lamoreaux and her long-
time collaborator, the late IZenneth L. Sokoloff, a tribute to the entre-
preneurial spirit, rather than, as East Coast-centric business historians 
have long assumed, an instance of cultural lag. The symbiosis of pure 
science and applied science at Bell Labs is, for Kenneth Lipartito, the 
original vision of Bell scientist Frank Jewett, and not, as AT&T-centric 
historians have long assumed, its betrayal. The ignorance of business 
history methods by Harvard Business School case writers is, for Chris-
topher McKenna, a morality tale that exposes the shoddiness of busi-
ness school pedagogy and its deleterious consequences for student and 
teacher alike. McKenna's conclusion is at once ironic and sobering. The 
very business history methods that case writers ignored had been 
largely invented at the Harvard Business School, while the lack of con-
cern with which well-respected business school academics willfully cir-
culated false information raises troubling questions about the sound-
ness of management education as an intellectual project. 
Other essays elaborate on existing scholarship. Building on the in-
tellectual framework devised by the economist Joseph A Schumpeter 
and modified by the management scholar Clayton Christensen, Marga-
ret B. W. Graham shows how scientists at Corning successfully navi-
gated a changing political economy to remain innovative. Like the Corn-
ing executives who are her protagonists, Graham contends. that the 
antitrust offensive waged by the federal justice department in the 1930s 
slowed innovation by forestalling interfirm alliances. Yet by foreclosing 
a business strategy that would have permitted Corning to enter into 
noncompeting agreements with its rivals, the political economy also 
encouraged Corning to expand its own research-and-development 
program-a program that culminated in the commercialization of the 
catalytic converter and fiber-optic cables. 
The willingness oflawmakers to rely on the courts to break up cor-
porate combines has long been regarded by business historians as a 
major reason for the distinctive institutional development of big busi-
ness in the United States. Its consequences for IBM are touched on in 
Usselman's essay on government-business relations in the computer 
7David A. Hounshell, "The Evolution of Industrial Research in the United States," in En-
gines of Innovation: U. S. Industrial Research at the End of an Era, ed. Richard S. ~osen­
bloom and William J. Spencer (Boston, 1996), 13-85. In contrast to most of the contnbutors 
to Challenge, Hounshell explicitly critiques existing categories of knowledge, such as. "pure 
science," which he calls an "ideology." David A. Hounshell, "The Evolution of Industrial Re-
search in the United States," in Encyclopedia of the United States in the Twentieth Century, 
vol. 2, ed. Stanley I. Kutler (New York, 1996), 832. 
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business. Usselman doubts that the specter of antitrust prompted IBM 
to contract with Microsoft and Intel to supply the components neces-
sary for IBM's first personal computer, rather than to manufacture 
these components in-house. Yet he also shows how antitrust worked in 
tandem with IBM's own business strategy to hasten the "unbundling" 
of the computer business. From a global perspective, antitrust is "per-
haps the most distinctive feature" of the twentieth-century American 
political economy. Thioughout the twentieth century, Americans have 
"consistently embraced an economic policy intended to break apart 
concentrated power and preserve market forces" (p. 272). 
Still other essays explore topics that we know little about. These 
include twentieth-century accounting methods at AT&T; a failed 
corporat~-academic alliance in New Jersey; consumer-producer rela-
tions in the automobile industry; and the associative activities of oil ex-
ecutives. "Firm-specific learning" at AT&T h<istened the emergence of 
novel accounting techniques in the i92os, reports Paul J. Miranti Jr. 
(p. 126). The failure of Stanford president Frederick Terman to estab-
lish a corporate-funded research university ill New J-~rsey in the i96os 
probes the relevance of geography in industriaf-policy, concludes 
Stephen B. Adams. Consumer lobbies ranging frame car dealers to femi-
nist activists shaped government-mandated credit policies for car buyers, 
reveals Clarke. The supposedly fiercely independent oihnen of the Gulf 
Coast learned how to cooperate follo-wing a series of devastating hurri-
canes that damaged their offshore oil rigs, contends Joseph A. Pratt. 
Innovation can be studied in many different ways. These essays are 
a testament to the continuing vitality of the comparativ_e institutionalist 
tradition in business history that was pioneered by Chandler and has 
been refined by his many distinguished students, as well as by the even 
larger number of historians who have found his legacy impossible to ig-
nore. Several of the contributors to Challenge distance themselves from 
Chandler's mostly positive evaluation of the efficacy of industrial re-
search. Yet all are preoccupied with a Chandlerian conundrum: how did 
business managers utilize the information at their disposal to fix the 
boundary between the firm and the market? 
The interpretative framework that this collection adopts will be fa-
miliar to readers of the controversial 2003 American Historical Review 
essay "Beyond Markets and Hierarchies" that Lamoreaux coauthored 
with Daniel M. G. Raff and Peter Temin. The Larnoreaux-Raff-Temin 
essay promised, as its title proclaimed, to go "beyond" markets and hi-
erarchies, and, in so doing, to establish a new post-Chandlerian prob-
lematique for business history. In fact, however, as many business his-
torians were quick to observe (primarily, so far as I am aware, in 
conversation rather than in print), its main interpretative contribution 
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was to draw attention to coordination mechanisms that mediated "be-
tween" the "invisible hand" of market transactions and the "visible 
hand" of managerial hierarChies. 8 In so doing, it consigned to historio-
graphical purgatory much of the most provocative recent scholarship in 
the field-including, in particular, the many books and articles that 
located business in its social, cultural, and political context without 
focusing primarily on the coordination mechanisms that shaped busi-
ness decision-making. 
Equally troubling for those business historians who are familiar 
with the literature of institutional economics was the extent to which 
this supposedly new synthesis built on concepts popularized more than 
two decades ago by Oliver E. Williamson. 9 In short, the Lamoreaux-
Temin-Raff essay did not define a new problematique for the field. 
Rather, it perpetuated the internalist tradition of business history that 
Chandler himself had invented while narrowing its range to emphasize 
certain issues, such as the cost of making business transactions, that 
Chandler himself always regarded as of secondary concern. For Chan-
dler, the "virtuous" paths of learning that were so central to knowledge 
creation were different from, and, it is worth underscoring, more fun-
damental than, the mere utilization of information to fix the boundary 
between the firm and the market.10 
Many business historians have called in the past few years for a 
broader, contextualist problematique for business history. In fuct, among 
them are at least four of the contributors to Challenge.11 It remains a 
tribute to th& enduring power of the internalist paradigm that it contin-
ues to inspire imaginative scholarship, even by scholars intent on dis-
tancing themselves from Chandler's legacy. 
The dangers of internalism are well lmown. Its principal virtue-
that is, its tight focus on managerial decision-making-can preclude the 
systematic investigation of the political and cultural context in which 
8Naomi R Lamoreaux, Daniel M. G. Raff, and Peter Temin, "Beyond Markets and Hier-
archies: Toward a New Synthesis of American Business History," American Historical Re-
view 108 (Apr. 2003): 404-32. Elsewhere, Lamoreaux:, Raff, and Temin have made it plain 
that they equate business history with a "provisional account" of the "circumstances" under 
which "archetypal coordination mechanisms have risen and declined." Lamoreaux, Raff, and 
Temin, "Against Whig History," Enterprise and Society 5 {2004): 386. 
9 Oliver R Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (New York, 1985). I am 
grateful to Matthias Kipping for reminding me of Williamson's contribution to our under-
standing of coordination mechanisms that mediated between the firm and the market. 
10 Richard R. John, "Elaborations, Revisions, Dissents: Alfred D. Chandler, Jr.'s The Visi-
ble Hand after Twenty Years," Business History Review 71(Summer1997): 152n1. 
11 Kenneth Lipa1tito, "Culture and the Practice of Business History," Business and Eco-
nomic History 24 (Winter 1995): 1-41; Sally H. Clarke, "Consumer Negotiations," Business 
and Economic History 26 (Fal1 1997): 101-22; Steven W. Usselman, "Sh1l Visible: Alfred 
Chandler's The Visible !{and," Technology and Culture 47 {July 2006): 584-96; Christopher 
D. McKenna, "In Memoriam: Alfred Chandler and the Soul of Business History," Enterprise 
and Society 9 (Sept. 2008): 422-25. 
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business decision-makers operated. It is easy, in retrospect, to credit 
business managers with aptitudes they did not possess or, alternatively, 
with failings that exaggerate their autonomy. ' 2 The problem of tautol-
ogy is unavoidable. The managers of successful firms are presumed to 
have capably analyzed the information at their disposal; the managers 
of unsuccessful firms, to have failed at the task. Concepts like "inno-
vation," "technology," and "entrepreneurship" are regarded merely as 
topics for investigation, rather than as value-laden constructs open to 
critique.13 
Further problems are raised by the editor's narrow conception of 
the relationship betvveen business and the state. Here, too, the editors 
inadvertently follow Chandler's lead: just as Chandler dowoplayed the 
influence of governmental institutions and civic ideals on business strat-
egy, so too do the editors. 
Much' of the problem can be explained by the curious way in which 
the editors locate the volume in the existing historical literature on the 
twentieth-century American political economy. The editors frame their 
contribution as a rejoinder to· certain ideas that_:they impute to the econ-
omist Joseph A. Schumpeter. Schumpeter, in tl}eir view, exaggerated 
the fragility of capitalism when he famously warned, ill Capitalism, So-
cialism, and Democracy (1942), that the astonishing productivity of 
big business made socialism inevitable by rendering entrepreneurship 
superfluous and, with it, the civic ideals.that legitimated capitalism as 
an economic order (pp. 43-44). 
The editors' reading of Schumpeter is open to question for tvvo 
qu,ite different reasons. It is by no means obvious that their interpreta-
tion of Capitalism, State, and Democracy is tenable; and, even if it is, it 
is anachronistic to upbraid a social theorist for his failure to anticipate 
phenomena that occurred long after his death. Schumpeter died in 
1950; socialism as a social movement lost much of its appeal with the 
collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989; the economic dowotnrn that raised 
questions about the innovativeness of the American economy-and that, -
in turn, inspired the anxiety that animates the editors of Challenge-
would not begin until 1973. 
Have the editors read Schumpeter correctly? To answer this ques-
tion adequately would involve a lengthy excursus into an ongoing 
12 For a related critique of recent historical writing on entrepreneurship by management 
scholars, see Geoffrey Jones and R. Daniel Wadhwani, "Schumpeter's Plea: Rediscovering 
History and Relevance in the Study of Entrepreneurship," Working Knowledge-February 
2006, Harvard Business School Working Paper 06-036. In this essay, Jones and Wadhwani 
embrace historical institutionalism, which they define as the systematic analysis of the rela-
tionship between business and the state: "Institutionalism focuses on how the historical de-
velopment of certain kinds of rules (e, g., laws, norms, rights) affects the nature of competi-
tion and innovation in industries" (p. 15). 
13 Philip Scranton, "Beyond Chandler?" Enterprise and Sociel:y 9 (Sept. 2008): 426-29. 
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debate among intellectual historians that shows no sign of abating.14 
Yet it can be noted in passing that Schumpeter's most recent biogra-
pher, Thomas I(. McCraw, interprets Capitalism, Socialism, and De-
mocracy in a very different way. Using the methods of the literary critic-
methods that the contributors to Challenge mostly eschew-McCraw 
contends that Schumpeter's masterwork should be read as a biting sat-
ire that was intended to arouse, outrage, and perhaps even amuse, 
rather than as a social scientific theory to be confirmed or rejected.15 
Even if one brackets the hermeneutical issues raised by Schumpet-
er's text, an additional question remains: is Schumpeter a useful foil? 
The problems that troubled Schnrnpeter were quite different from the 
problems that confront contemporaries today. Socialism, while by no 
means dead, has few influential champions in the United States-despite, 
or perhaps because of, the huge recent government bailouts for big 
business-while the United States confronts a panoply of overseas chal-
lengers that neither Schumpeter nor any other midcentury social theo-
rist could have anticipated. Entrepreneurship, in short, has proved more 
resilient than Schumpeter seemed to allow, while socialism (as distin-
guished from "corporate welfare" or even "welfare state liberalisn1") has 
lost much of its appeal. And what of the technological transformations 
of the recent past? However prescient Schumpeter may have been as an 
analyst of interwar capitalism, he knew nothing of the personal com-
puter, the mobile telephone, or the Internet. It would thus seem to be 
unfair to chide him for failing to anticipate economic developments that 
would not occur until after 1970-or, for that matter, to critique his 
time-and-place-bound analysis of government-business relations. 
The editors' reading of Schumpeter builds on the influential case for 
his relevance to business historians that has been put forward in recent 
decades by Louis Galambos.16 Galambos is a prolific trainer of business 
14The propensity of business historians unfamiliar with Schumpeter's literary style to 
read Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy as an obituary for capitalis1.11 is understandab!e. 
Schumpeter entitled the first section of chapter 12 "The Obsolescence of the Entrepreneunal 
Function"; called the Vanderbilts, the Camegies, and the Rockefellers the "true pacemakers 
of socialism"; and referred at least once to the "perfectly bureaucratized giant industrial 
unit." Even so, he predicated his analysis of the triumph of socialism on the satiation of hu-
man wants-an eventuality that he regarded as "very far off' -and confined his most detailed 
analysis of "The Problem of Bureaucratic Management" to a different section of the book in 
which he speculated about the problems that would confront a future "socialist regime." Jo-
seph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy (New York, 1975; 1st ed. 1942), 
131-34, 205-10. 
15Thomas K McCraw, Prophet of Innovation: Joseph Schumpeter and Creative Destruc-
tion (Cambridge, Mass., 2007), ch. 21. 
16 Louis Galambos, "Identity and the Boundaries of Business Hi<>tory: An Essay on Consen-
sus and Creativity," in Business History around the World, ed. Franco Amatori and Geoffrey 
Jones (Cambridge, U.K., 2003), 16; Galambos, "End of the Century Reflections on Weber 
and Schumpeter-with Karl Marx Lurking in the Background," Industrial and Corporate 
Change 5, no. 3 (1996): 925-31. 
Literature Review / 194 
historians with a Iongstandi . . 
· ng mterest m the wellsp · f b . innovation; his essays on the "o . . rings o us1ness 
to give the field a measure of ~~:~1z~ti~nal synthesis" have done much 
bos himself has published o .ec u coherence.17 Though Galam-
If n a variety of topics he ch t . . se as a friendly critic of Ch di . . . • arac er1zes h1m-
b an enan mternahsrn of hi h h h een a p'erceptive interpreter.18 ' W C e as long 
Galambos's influence on Challen e is h di . 
the contributors wrote their PhD di g . ar y accidental. Several of . 
the editors dedicate this volume to h~:rta~~n.s ~der his direction, and 
an earlier age, this project mi ht have as e1r reader a:r:d advisor." In 
schrift to a distinguished m tg d been conceptualized as a fest-
h en or an colleague In its 1 th di 
ave encouraged the contribute t 1 ·. Pace, e e 'tors Galambos has long been identi:sd·o exp ~re a s1n~le ti:eme with which 
business innovatio . th : . name y, the h1stor1cal evolution of 
Th . . n In e twentieth-century United States 
. e contributors' indebtedness t Gal b . . . 
In their shared assum tions . o am, os IS particularly evident 
ness history and the history rt;hardumg thde relationship between busi-
ff 
0 e mte States Like Gal b h 
areputo byconventionalpoliticalc t . " . am os, t ey 
"progressive"); intrigued by what th: egor1es ( conservative," "liberal," 
strictures on economic dev l ~ un~ersta~d to be Schumpeter's 
fluence on innovation of co e opmt en~, a~ ambivalent about the in-
rpora e g1antism Some t 'b Lamoreaux and Sokoloff) are niore . . . con r1 ut9rs (e.g., 
research and development than oth s~eptical of corporate-sponsored 
all regard the industrial research I bers e.g., Graham and Lipartito). Yet 
· th . a oratory as an engin f · . 
m e mid-twentieth centu 11 e o innovation ays into business history. ry as we as a touchstone for their own for-
N owhere is Galambos' s influence . d . 
utors' adoption ofhls stage model of ~or~ evi ent th~ In the contrib-
Llke Galambo th encan economic development 
period before :'ss~ ~~:~b:to:. ch~racteri~e the United States in th~ 
which a multitude of small ~y !' ~1 proprietary capitalism, an era in 
unregulated market m· a pol"trns]Jos ed for advantage in a more or less 
. I ica economy th t " b In the sense that large-scale or . t. f a w~s pre- ureaucratic" 
gan1za ions o any land-public or private 
i1Lo • I 
. ms Ga ainbos, "The Emerging Organizati al S h . . . 
ness History Review 44 (Autumn 1970)· _ 
0~ ynt esrs, m American History," Busi-
01?-Y, and Professionalization: Central Th~s 9{ ~aJambos~ 'T.echnology, Political Econ-~istory Review 57 (Winter 1983): 471-93· Galru:b t ~. Organ~zational Synthesis," Business 
sis: ~tructure and Process in the Twent' fu d os, Rec~stmg the Organizational Syntbe-Re~z:w7? (Spring 2005): 1-38. ie an Twenty-Frrst Centuries," Business History 
, Louis Galambos, "Reflections on Alfred D Ch ,, . (Sept. 2008): 415-18. · andler, Jr., Enterprise and Society 9 
<9 For a more detailed critique of Galambos's s 
ment, see Richard R John "Ruli . tag~ ~odel of American economic develop-
Amer' ,, . . ' ng PassIOnS' Political Eco · N" 
. 1ca, In Ruling Passions: Political Ee · . . nomy in meteenth-Century 
(University Park, 2006), esp. lJI126. onomy in Nineteenth Century America, ed. John 
Literature Review I 195 
-had yet to exist.19. Political considerations, Galambos concedes, loomed 
large in the emergence of the oligopolies that figured so prominently 
in the post-1880 period. Yet they were unimportant in the pre-1880 
period, when the "dominant" organizational form remained the "atom-
istic, highly competitive alternative."20 Like Galambos, the contribu-
tors are much impressed by the "organizational revolution" that, or so 
Galambos has posited in a series of essays and books, transformed 
the United States, beginning around 1880, into a "corporate common-
wealth."21 And, like Galambos, the contributors read Schumpeter as 
a critic of big business, rather than, like Chandler, as its champion. 
"Schumpeter was suspicious of great corporate combines," Galambos 
declared in 2002, articulating a sentiment that he has long held, and 
with which the contributors concur-"not because they were monopo-
listic but because they tended to be organized along bureaucratic lines. 
Bureaucracy, Schumpeter said, was the enemy of the entrepreneur."22 
In a number of respects, Galambos' s own writings on business and 
innovation are more capacious than those of the contributors to Chal-
lenge. 23 For Galambos, the post-1970 decades are a new frontier for 
historians of innovation; for the contributors, in contrast, the twentieth 
century is, at least implicitly, confined primarily to the decades that 
preceded the 1973 economic downturn. FOr Galambos, the recent his-
tory of innovation in the United States is best understood by widening 
the lens to underscore the connections between the United States and 
20 Louis Galarribos, "The Triumph of Oligopoly,~ in American Economic Development in 
Historical Perspective, ed. Thomas Weiss and Donald Schaefer (Stanford, 2004), 244-45. It 
is perhaps worth noting that Galambos's characterization of the nineteenth-century Ameri-
can economy as "atomistic" and "highly competitive" is a locus classicus of a habit of mind 
that Schumpeter sagely warned against. To contend that the economy was once competitive, 
and is now monopolistic, Schumpeter reflected, involves the "creation" of an "entirely imag-
ined golden age of perfect competition that at some time somehow metamorphosed itself 
into the monopolistic age, whereas :it is quite clear that perfect competition has at no time 
been more of a reality than it is at present." Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democ-
racy, 81. 
21 Louis Galambos and Joseph Pratt, The Rise of the Corporate Commonwealth: United 
States Business and Public Policy in the Twentieth Century (New York, 1988). 
22 Louis Galambos and Eric John Abrahamson, Anytime, Anywhere: Entrepreneurship 
and the Ci'eation of a Wireless World (Cambridge, U.K., 2002), 6. See also Galambos, "Iden-
tity and the Boundaries of Business History," 16. 
23 My characterization of what one might-somewhat awkwardly-call Galambosian busi-
ness history is informed by Galambos's three programmatic Business History Review essays 
on the "organizational synthesis," as well as by the following: Louis Galambos, "The Innova-
tive Organization: Viewed from the Shoulders of Schumpeter, Chandler, Lazonick, et al.," 
Business and Economic History 21 (Fall 1993): 79-91; Galambos, "Identity and the Bound-
aries of Business History''; Galambos, ''M:yth and Reality in the Study of America's Consumer 
Culture," in The Modern Worlds of Business and Industry: CUitures, Technology, Labor, ed. 
Karen R. Merrill (Tumhout, Belgium, 1998), 183-203; and Galambos, ''What Makes Us Think 
We Can Put Business Bacl{ into American History?" Business and Economic History 20 
(1991): 1-11. 
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the rest of the world. For the contributors, in contrast, the United States 
remains on center stage. 
For Galambos, a "powerful culture" that was often the byproduct of 
a disciplined and careerist professionalism was an indispensable pre-
condition for the innovative enterprise. For the contributors, in contrast, 
pulture constrains as often as it empowers, and management is con-
flated with the optimal utilization of information necessary to advanta-
geously fix the boundary between the firm and the market. Even when 
the contributors focus specifically on professionalism-as, for example, 
Lipartito did in his essay on Bell Labs-they typically treat it in a nar-
rowly instrumental fashion, rather than, as Galambos advocated, as a 
comprehensive mind-set that shaped personal identity as well as oc-
cupational roles. ' 4 And for Galambos, the absorption of the field of 
business history by a field that is more globally oriented and critically 
self-aware-=--such as, for example, the "history,of capitalism"-is an out-
come to be desired. For the contributors, in contrast, business history 
remains a field with few obvious links to the broader world of historical 
scholarship. 2s 
A final difference in perspective concerns the relationship between 
business and the state. For Galambos, the political economy has be-
come in the twentieth century one of th~ three maiii "pillars" of his "or-
ganizational synthesis. "26 For the contributors, in contrast, the political 
economy is typically reactive, and almost never a structuring presence 
in its own right. To be sure, the contributors_ have at various points 
many perceptive things to say about patent rights, antitrust, and federal 
regulation. Yet, like Schumpeter-and, at least in part, because of their 
reliance on a Schumpeterian interpretative framework-they rarely 
characterize the political economy as an engine of innovation on a par 
with entrepreneurship. Conspicuously absent, for example, is any sus-
tained discussion of the role of the state in the emergence of radio, the 
24 Galambos, "Innovative Organization," 87; Galambos, "Myth and Reality/' esp. 190-94. 
• 
25 ~ouis Galambos, "Identity and the Boundaries of Business History," 28-29. Harvard 
h1stonan Sven Beckert urged historians to move in an analogous direction-that is, to sub-
sume "business history" under the more capacious rubric, "history of capitalism"-during a 
state-of-the-field roundtable at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Histori-
ans in A:pril 2010. Such a re branding has the advantage of bringing business history into dia-
logue with a variety of related fields, including social history, cultural history, and labor his-
tory, and, in so doing, making it more explicitly contextualist. Even so, it is not -without its 
~roblems. It would, for example, presumably exclude the study of business phenomena in 
times and places that are noncapitalistic. In addition, it might encourage tendentious and 
sterile theoretical debates about the dynamics of capitalism, and, conceivably, even the ne-
glect of business institutions altogether. Nevertheless, it has the advantage of foregrounding a 
~ey concept-namely, "c~pitalism"-that business historians often take for granted, while open-
ing up the field to htstonans who regard the identifier "business" as unduly constraining. 
26 Galambos, "Technology, Political Economy, and Professionalization." 
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airplane, the computer, or the Internet. Even major military co~flicts­
including, most notably, the Second World War-go unmentioned-
despite their well-known role as engines of in~ovation. . 
The contributors depart from Galambos s example in tvvo furth~r 
ways. First, they include no case studies of innovation in pharm~ceutl­
cals or recent telecommunications, tvvo topics that Galambos himself 
has written extensively about.27 In fact, the pharmaceutical business 
makes but a single, decidedly inauspiCious appearance: the failure of 
New Jersey pharmaceutical firms to invest in a proposed New ~ersey:­
based research institute was, according to Adams, one reason t~s proj-
ect failed (p. 185). Second, and more significantly; the contribut~rs 
miss the opportunity to engage with any major twentieth-century soc~al 
theorists other than Schumpeter-including, in particular, those social 
theorists who like Manual Castells, have strongly emphasized the influ-
ence on post~1970 American business of innovations in information 
technology. Nowhere, for example,. do any of ;h~' contributors po~de;, 
the potential utility of constructs like Castells s network enterprise, 
or, for that matter, any of the other constructs that Castells has devised 
to help malce sense of the recent past. This is true even thou,gh Gal~­
bos himself has urged business historians to engage Castells s analysis, 
if only to underscore.its limitations.28 Indeed, for a book whose t~eme 
is innovation, it is a bit odd that its contributors have chosen an inter-
pretative framework that is grounded in events that are almos.t a cen-
tury old. Galambos moved on; so too did Chandler. To a considerable 
degree, the contributors have not. 
.The neglect of Castells has consequences that exte~d beyond the 
contributors' characterization of'the recent past. Castells s undogmat1c 
approach toward governmental activism contrasts sharply with Schum-
peter's cranky negativism. For Castells, the state has al';ays played a 
"decisive" role in mediating between technology and society; depe~d­
ing on the circumstances, it could stall, unleash, or lead technological 
211ouis Galambos with Jane Eliot Sewell, Networks of Innovation: Vaccine Development 
at Merck, Sharp& Dahme, and Mulford, 1895-1995 (Camb~idge, U.K., 1995)'. P. RoyVagelos 
and Louis Galambos, Medicine, Science and Merck (Cambndge, U.K, 2004), Galambos and 
Abrahamson Anytime, Anywhere. 
2sGalambos "Recasting the Organizational Synthesis," 3-4, 36 .. ?alambos s.tructured 
this essay-the -iliird in his "organizational synthesis" ~logy-as a c17ttcal eval?atton .of th.e 
"Castells framework" (p. 4). Galambos is not alone in calling th~ attention o~bus1n~s ~1st?n­
ans to Castells, as well as to other social theorists who have tne~ to explain the distii:ct1ve-
ness of the post-1970 period. The neglect of Castells by the contributors.of Ch~llenge IS puz-
zling, since business historians in recent years have repeatedly emphas1"zed his relevance ;?, 
the field. This is true even for one of the editors of Challenge. Scranton, Beyond Ch3;fidl:r · 
426-29; Richard R. John, "Rendezvous -with Information? Comp~ters and Commumcat1ons 
Networks in the United States," Business History Review 75 (Spnng 2001): 1-7; U~selman, 
"Still Visible," 592n12. 
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innovation. Castells is, in addition, a perceptive observer of the eco-
nomic restructuring that began around 1970-and, in particular, of the 
role of information technology in creating the material foundation for 
new modes of coordination. For Castells, the primary engine of innova-
tion in the pre-1970 period remained the large, hierarchical enterprise 
-;rheth~r public or private. 29 Only after 1970, in Castells's view, would 
this begin to change-largely because of technological innovations in 
microelectronics that no pre-1970 social theorist could possibly have 
foreseen. 
Like many studies of innovation, Challenge downplays the influence 
on ?~siness strategy of the political economy. Yet just aS the strategic 
dec1s1ons of entrepreneurs have shaped the_ organizational structure of 
the .firm, so, too has tpe structuring presence of the state shaped the 
business strategy of innovative-and not so innovative-entrepreneurs, 
firms, and sectors.30 This lacuna is perhaps to be expected. Until rela-
tively recently, most business historians have focused primarily on the 
_entrepreneur and the firm and, in so doing, have marginalized not only 
the political economy in which the entrepreneur and the firm evolved 
but also the social and cultural context in which business decision~ 
makers operated. Even so, it remains surprising for a collection of origi-
nal essays that champion a new research agenda to remain in this respect 
so resolutely traditional. At the very least, it would seem to be worth-
while for business historians of the recent past to follow Galambos's 
lead and engage social theorists like Castells whose interpretative 
frameworks have been devised to explain the technological, political, 
and cultural developments that have occurred since 1970. 
The editors' priorities are evident in the organizational scheme they 
have adopted. The first section deals with the furn; the second with in-
terfirrn relations; and the third with the relationship between the firm 
and the state. As a consequence, readers are implicitly led to assume 
that :he influ~nce of the state on American business has been primarily _ 
reactive, and IS confined to the relatively recent past.31 The contributors 
a~e correct to challenge the all-too-common assumption, which they at-
tnbute to Schumpeter, that public policy has invariably favored weak 
29
Manuel Castells, The Rise of the Network Society (Oxford, 1996), 4, 13, ch. 3. See also 
Castells, The Internet Galaxy: Reflections on the Internet, Business, and Society (Oxford, 
2001), ch. 1. 
3
° For a related discussion, see Matthias Kipping, "Business-Government Relations: Be-
yond Performance Issues," in Business History around the World, ed. Franco Amatori and 
Geoffrey Jones (New York, 2003), 372-93. 
' 
31
T?e const~t~tive role of the state in shaping business strategy is, for example, a central t?~me in the ong~nal ~ssays collected together in Richard R. John, ed., Ruling Passions: Po-
lztical Econo;ny 1n Jl!ineteenth-Centi:ry America (University Park, Penn., 2006). These es-
says emphasize the urlluence of political structure on business strategy rather than-as is 
for example, typically the case in Challenge-the other way around. ' ' 
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enterprises that stifled innovation. In fact, if this is indeed ':hats.chum-
peter contended, he was mistaken: in many instances pubhc pohcy h~s 
fostered competition that challenged incumbents. Unfortunately this 
insight is mostly overlooked in this collection. If, for example, ?ne co~­
pares Challenge with the recent collection of essays on the bus1nes~ hIS-
tory of the Internet edited by William A.spray and Paul E. Ceruzzi, the 
neglect Of the political economy is appa~ent. As:J?ra~ and C~ruz~; docu-
ment the indispensable role of the state in spurring 1nnova:a.on: Chal-
lenge, in contrast, is more congenial to ~he neolib:ral, ant1stat~st ethos 
that has dominated political discourse in the Un1teQ. States s1nc~ the 
1970s. This is true even though one of the editors has hims_elf pubhshe.d 
a pathbreaking monograph on the ninet~enth~century ~ailroad t~at is 
highly sensitive to the political economy m which the railroad business 
emerged.33 Even Chandler hinted at times at a more avowedly progres-
sive collception of the state as an agent of cha~ge. 34 . . 
One example makes my point. The contnbutors nghtly credit fed-
eral antitrust legislation with shaping the business strategy of IBM and 
its rivals in the 1960s and 1970s. Yet they ignore the influence of ant1-
monopoly laws and court rulings on the business stra:egy ~f t:leg_raph 
·ant Western Union and its rivals a century before. This om1ss1on is re-~aling since the editors hail Western Union as "probably" the most genero~s sponsor of "technological discovery" in its day (p. 5). For the 
contributors-as for Chancller-Western Union is pr~s:imed to be a 
"natural monopoly'' whose business strategy was conditioned by tech-
nological imperatives and economic incentives, rather ~an a ~owerful 
corporation whose bustness strategy had been shaped in myriad ways 
by the state. 35 As a consequence, rea~ers are :mstakenly led to assume 
that the refusa)_ of Western Union to intemahze research ~d develop-
ment was, the result not of political fiat but, rather, of an instru~ental 
calculus ihvolving the choice of appropriate coordination ~echan1sms. 
f~ fact Western Union managers hired independent inventors to 
meet the challenge posed by an antimonopoly political economy that 
3"William Aspray and Paul E. Ceruzzi, eds., The Internet and American Business (Cam-
bridge, Mass., 2008). . · .,. h l d 
33Steven w. Usselman, Regulating Railroad Innovation: Bus1ness, .Lee no ogy, an 
Politics in America, 1840-1920 (Cambridge, U.K., 2002). . . . ,, . . 
34Richard R John, "Turner, Beard, Chandler: Progressive H1stonans, .Business H1story 
Review 82 (Summer 2008): 227-40. . . 
35Qn the political economy of Western Union, see Richard R. John, Network Nation: In-
nting American Telecommunications (Cambridge, Mass., 2010), chs. 4-5. ~or the h1sto-
".' h' 1 "Ont~·.+ see John "Telecommunications," Enterprise and Society 9 (Sept. 
nograp tea '--' e.u, ' . ·1 d d h l 
2oo8): 507-20. Western Union's business strategy in the pos~-C1vi War eca es as ong 
been something of an Achilles heel for business hist?rians. I~ is, for example, probably no~ 
coincidental that the telegraph business was the specialty of Richard B. DuBoff, the coautho 
of one of the earliest and most trenchant critiques of The Visible Hand. 
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empowered independent inventors while constraining the managers of 
huge corporate combines like Western Union. It was this challenge-
rooted not in technology or economics but in politics and culture-that 
explained why Western Union managers made the decisions that they 
did. Structure shaped strategy. The structuring presence of the state en-
couraged Western Union managers to adopt a narrowly focused busi-
ness strategy. The telephone, the phonograph, and the electric light all 
emerged in an entrepreneurial hothouse that had been spawned by an 
antimonopoly political economy. In this instance, as in many others, in-
novation was the product not of business alone, but of the dynamic in-
terplay between business and the state.36 
Do these essays set the agenda for future historically oriented schol-
arship on business innovation? In certain respects, they do. The locus 
of innovation is likely to remain a major theme for historical inquiry, 
especially as business historians turn their attention, as they unques-
tionably will, to the recent past. Even so, the contributors' explanatory 
power is limited by their neglect of government spending-including, in 
particular, military spending-in combination with their implicit pre-
sumption that the regulatory apparatus is best understood as a conse-
quence of business strategy, but not as a cause. Further questions are 
raised by the presumption that disruptive change is invariably a positive 
good. "When, one wonders, is creative destruction merely destruction?37 
One final question is deserving of more extended discussion. Does 
it make sense, in a w9rld haunted by poverty, global warming, and the 
specter of nuclear annihilation, to evaluate business innovation solely 
in terms of economic output, profitability, firm longevity, and national 
power? Might it not be time for business historians to examine more 
critically the ethical implications of business innovation for cherished 
civic ideals such as equal access, social justice, and environmental sus--
tainability? The future of business innovation is not morally neutral, 
and neither should historical writing be impartial about its past. Na-
palm was a business innovation; so, too, was crack cocaine. 
The essays in Challenge repay careful reading, and the editors' intro-
ductions have been prepared with intelligence and care. Yet, in the end, 
the whole is not greater than the sum of the parts. Challenge tells us 
more about where business history has been than where it ought to go, 
and does more to reinforce the insular internalism that has long kept 
business history at the margins of historical inquiry than to point it to-
ward the cosmopolitan contextualism that has the potential to illumi-
nate the relationship of business, innovation, and the political economy 
36 John,NetworkNation, ch. 5. 
371 am indebted to Edward J. Balleisen for this distinction. 
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in the malcing of the modern world. If American business is to remain 
innovative in the twenty-first century, it would seem prudent to exam-
ine critically not only business decision making, but also a constella-
tion of other factors that included, but that were no means confined to, 
supportive governmental institutions and civic ideals-since these fac-
tors, too, have often proved indispensable in spawning the gales of 
"creative destruction" that the contributors rightly regard as a hallmark 
of innovation. 
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